Living-into, living-with: A Schutzian account of the player/character relationship by Hardesty, Rebecca A.
Living-Into, Living-With: a Schutzian Account
of the Player-Character Relationship
Author’s corrected version
Rebecca A. Hardesty∗
University of California, San Diego
Note: The author has here made several minor revisions, for the sake of
clarity, to the published version of the article in Glimpse. Page numbers in
this document do not match those of the publication. Please cite only the
published version.
1. Introduction1
Games Studies reveals the performative nature of playing a character in
a virtual-game-world (Nitsche 2008, p.205; Pearce 2006, p.1; Taylor 2002,
p.48). Tbe Player/Character relationship is typically understood in terms
of the player’s in-game “presence” (Boellstorff 2008, p.89; Schroeder 2002,
p.6). This gives the appearance that living-into a game-world is an all-or-
nothing affair: either the player is “present” in the game-world, or they
are not. I argue that, in fact, a constitutive phenomenology reveals the
Player/Character relationship to be a multi-dimensional matter of empathy.
I advance a broadly Schutzian framework, drawing on his 1932 discussions
of “face-to-face encounters” and ”historical predecessors,” showing how at-
tention to empathy reveals a variety of “presences” that different kinds of
Player/Character relationships afford.2 The central determinants of empa-
thetic affordances which I focus on here are (i) how much players know about
a character (especially the character’s past) and (ii) how players learn this
∗rhardesty@ucsd.edu or rebeccaahardesty@gmail.com
1This paper is part of a larger project that looks at Visualizations and Identity in Social
Environments (VISE) and would not be possible without my collaborator Ben Sheredos
who has provided invaluable feedback o nthis text. This paper has also benefited from the
guidance of Morana Alacˇ, my Ph.D. advisor. The finished work is also indebted to the
participants and committee of the Society for Phenomenology and Media’s 17th Annual
Conference and their generous feedback.
2This is intended to be general enough to be applied to the relationship that a player
of any game has with their character.
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information. The simplest characters (e.g., Halo’s “Master Chief”) permit
the player to interact with them only as anonymous extensions of their own
lived body. But when (as in Amnesia: The Dark Descent) player and charac-
ter undergo synchronous discovery of personal history, the player “lives-into”
the character as more than just an anonymous, yet coordinated, organ, in-
stead sharing both time and internal space with it. In other cases (e.g. Mass
Effect), a character’s past prior to, or moral values different from, the player,
can make the character appear as a personalistic “other,” allowing the player
to only live alongside, or “live-with” that character.3 The purpose of this
discussion will be to show that a phenomenological analysis reveals that the
relationship between a player and their character is complex, highly variable,
and inherently social. Furthermore, it will add to the growing body of schol-
arship that demonstrates that video games are rich social objects deserving
of study.
2. “Presence” in Game Studies
Presence is one of the central foci of Game Studies literature on video games
and is significant to the field because it is a way of capturing the broad, multi-
faceted experience of self in a game-world. Despite varied conceptions of
presence, Michael Nitsche provides a concise definition which is broad enough
to merit widespread agreement. Presence is: “a mental state where a user
feels subjectively present with a video game space as the result of immersion”
(Nitsche, 2008, p.203). Nitsche goes on to distinguish three types of presence
one has when playing a video game. 1) “personal presence:” the feeling of
undeniably being in the game-world. 2) “social presence:” a player’s feeling
of being with others in the same game-world. 3) “environmental presence:”
the presence of the world itself as it is presented to the player as being world-
like.
Generally speaking, “personal presence” concerns how and why players
have meaningful and legitimate social experiences in virtual game-worlds,
although treatments of presence vary (cf. Hardesty & Sheredos 2017). Some
approaches are inspired by Bernie De Koven’s idea of “play communities” and
his use of psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi concept of “flow” (see Pearce
3Please note that all of these games are “single-player games,” which means that the
only human-controlled character is the one that the player is currently playing. All other
characters in that hrame-world are controlled by the computer and not playable by the
player.
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2006, p.5). Others adopt a performance-theoretic view which sees players as
stepping into a “dramatic role in relation to the game space” (Nitsche, 2008,
p.212). Others explicitly reject the experience of playing a videogame as
“mere roleplaying.” In these accounts, a player achieves presence through
the establishment of selfhood via a virtual avatar (Taylor, 2002, pp.42,44).
I focus on “personal presence,” i.e. how a player experiences their self in
a game-world. Before understanding how one relates to other players in a
game-world that allows multiple players, it is important to understand how
a single player relates to their character and the presence in the game-world
they achieves through this relationship. Despite the careful attention Nitsche
pays to the variety of presences, his work, like the majority Game Studies,
treats presence as an all-or-nothing state. A player either feels there in the
gameworld or does not.4
Having given a brief overview of some ideas of “presence” in the literature
on video games in Game Studies, I will now show that a phenomenological
analysis supports this literature, and also reveals personal presence as highly
variable and flexible.
3. Two Concepts of Empathy
In order to understand the Player/Character relationship and, specifically,
how a player’s character presents itself to the player as such and what kind
of empathetic intentionality (or noetic act) is involved, §§3.1–3.2 will outline
two concepts of empathy found within phenomenological literature.
3.1. Living-with
The first concept of empathy can be found in Edmund Husserl’s 1910–1911
lecture series The Basic Problems of Phenomenology in which he devoted
considerable space to exploring the role of empathy in the program of phe-
nomenology. For Husserl, “In empathy [Einfu¨hlung ], the empathizing I ex-
periences the inner life or, to be more precise, the consciousness of the other
I” (ibid., p.83). It is a technical term that connotes a kind of intentionality
akin to a perception, where the unique feature of empathy is that is presents
one with another’s subjectivity. Husserl remarks elsewhere that “empathiz-
ing perception” would have been a more accurate description (2006, p.164).
With this kind of empathy an other is actively constituted in one’s experience
4This is not a failing of the field, but an area that has not been explored due to the
relatively young state of video games and the little attention they have received.
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as being an other who has an equal capacity of self- and other-awareness.
Alfred Schutz’ description of the “face-to-face” relationship one has with
another person is similar.5 Schutz says that such a relationship occurs when
“the partners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in
each other’s lives for however a short amount of time” (Schutz, 1932, p.164).
Schutz can be seen as elaborating on Husserl’s description Einfu¨hlung by
stating that in an empathetic relationship the participants must affect and
be aware of each other as well as “grow older together” by having different
orientations to the same experience. For the sake of this paper, this kind of
empathy will be called “living-with” because it implies being with an other.
3.2. Living-into
“Living-with,” or Einfu¨hlung, is to be distinguished from a second concept
of empathy. Edith Stein and Dan Zahavi have said that although Husserl
intended for “empathy” to refer to the intentional acts that present us with
others who have their own subjective experiences removed from the per-
ceiver, there is a threat that the phenomenological account of our access
to another’s interiority could dissolve their alterity (Stein 1964, pp.12-13;
Zahavi 2001, p.153). This is because in Husserl’s writing, it is sometimes
suggested that the way in which one experience an other is that one fun-
damentally experiences them as similar to oneself. This kind of empathy
becomes a kind of “oneness” (whether complete or partial) with an other.
Stein argues that this is an incorrect reading of Husserl; however, it was one
that appeared in contemporaneous literature.6 She characterizes her inter-
locutor’s (Lipps) view as “I am living ’in’ the one in the same way as in the
other, experience the movements of the one in the same way as those of the
other” (Stein, 1964, p.16). In her dissertation, On the Problem of Empathy,
she goes to great effort to counter this reading of Husserl, as does Zahavi,
who suggests going “beyond empathy” in order to resolve the issues Husserl’s
critics raised (Zahavi, 2001, p.154). This type of empathy will be referred to
as “living-into” because it captures the experience of oneness on this reading
of the term.
5For a full discussion on Schutzian face-to-face relationships in video games, please see
Hardesty & Sheredos (2017).
6Please note that this was Edith Stein’s doctoral dissertation on which Edmund Husserl
served as her advisor.
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3.3. Reconciliation
Stein and Zahavi have not sought to reconcile these two definitions of empa-
thy; instead they point out only that phenomenology needs a concept of the
first sort and that this has to be distinguished from the second meaning. I
will reconcile the concepts by distinguishing them as two species of empathy.
To summarize, Husserl’s Einfu¨hlung will be called “living-with.” The second
version of empathy, characterized by a feeling of oneness with an other, will
be called “living-into.” Delimiting these two versions as different species of
empathy makes them valuable tools when attempting to account for, and
describe, the Player/Character relationship.
4. The Lived Body and “Master Chief”
Turning now to the case studies, an appeal to Schutz’ work will help deploy
the two species of empathy covered in 3 and provide an account of the pres-
ence as it is achieved through the Player/Character relationship. However,
before directly applying these two kinds of empathy, I will offer a distin-
guishing case which does not involve either kind of empathy, but is what
most people think of when they hear the word “video game.”7
In Halo, a player interacts with the game-world as a faceless, cybernetically-
enhanced super-solider named “Master Chief” who critics have described as
not being a person (Gray, 2013). The player has a first-person perspective
on Master Chief and sees through his eyes, from within, as he shoots villains
and saves the day.8
Schutz’s contemporary and friend Aron Gurwitsch becomes helpful for
understanding the ways in which a player relates to Master Chief. Gurwitsch
relies on Maurice MerleauPonty and Gestalt theory in order to understand
the lived body. The lived body is not confined to the boundaries of the flesh
body, but it is a coordinated accomplishment of many things (or organs)
7The purpose of going through this example is threefold: 1) to draw the distinction be-
tween an anonymous tool/avatar and a personalistic character; 2) to clarify that empathy
is not involved in the relationship between a player and this type of character; 3) to show
that even in, what some might call, a superficial and shallow game, a Schutzian approach
can reveal the richness of Player/Character relationships.
8Although this game does allow one to play with other real people (who are also playing
other iterations of Master Chief), for the sake of this paper, the player of Master Chief is
just interacting with computer-controlled characters.
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in action.9 This is consistent with Schutz’ own views on “the world within
potential reach” which he describes as the world as it appears in immediate
experience. The experienced (social) life-world is coordinated with respect
to one’s body and, because of the dynamic system of the body, is in constant
change (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p.37).
Thus, in Halo, when a player is attempting to make it safely through
a level, their physical body, which is controlling Master Chief, is also re-
sponding to the virtual events in the game-world. Master Chief becomes a
bodily organ, mutually coordinated with their meaty organs. In this way,
the physical and virtual bodies qualify each other and the lived body of
the player when playing Halo becomes a unique whole which includes the
player’s physical body, Master Chief, and whatever gaming technology used
play the game. Master Chief becomes an anonymous extension, or avatar10
that reshapes and affects one’s overall body-schema. Master Chief is not a
personalistic “other” because he is not experienced as such any more than
one’s own hands are considered independent people.
Although there is an interesting player-character relationship here, it is
not one of empathy. My remarks here in §4 do not preclude the other two
case studies from involving an extension of the lived body; however, the
following sections will focus on how they are representative of the two species
of empathy (living-into and living-with).
5. Living-into “Daniel”
In Amnesia: the Dark Descent, the player begins in a dark house without
knowing who they are, how to move, or what they are supposed to do. Al-
though this is the experience of many players starting a new game, what is
9“Far from begin merely mutually coordinated, the different organs and their functions
condition and determine each other in such a way that in the function of any organ... the
functions of other organs are enveloped and implied. In dependence upon one another and
with regard to the task towards which the body is polarized in a given situation, functions
are assigned to several organs involved in total bodily posture” (Gurwitsch, 2010, p.294).
10The distinction between avatar and character is an important one which I have flagged.
In this paper, I am reserving the use of the term “avatar” to capture the type of character
that is experienced as tool-like or, as this discussion has said, an extension of the lived
body and not as a personalistic other. Using the term avatar to describe all characters
misses the phenomenological point that a player does not experience all characters as tools.
As §§5–6 show, players experience characters from different games as being personalistic
others.
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interesting about Amnesia is that the character is in the same position as the
player: the character has total amnesia. Events in the gameworld inform the
player quickly that their name is Daniel and that they are being stalked by a
zombie. This is a “horror-survival” game whose success depends on it being
scary in such a way that the player feels that their own safety is in jeopardy,
despite the game-world being unable to physically harm the player. The
game requires that a player become immersed in the world and experience
personal presence, i.e. feeling that they are there in the game-world. What
adds to the feeling of immersion is that the player sees through Daniel’s eyes
in a first-person point of view and never sees the backside of the body.
This close relationship that the player has with Daniel is a paradigmatic
example of “living-into,” which is characterized by a feeling of oneness where
the alterity between self and other dissolves. This kind of Player/Character
relationship surpasses the requirements of “living-with,” or Einfu¨hlung. Schutz
provides several requirements for establishing a faceto- face, or living-with,
relationship: 1) a person must share a “community of space” with an other;
2) the partners of an interaction must “grow older together” (Schutz, 1932,
p.181).
The requirement of sharing a community of space with an other, is sur-
passed through the relationship a player has with Daniel and, as result, the
player lives-into him, not as an other or a tool/avatar, but as themselves. Be-
cause a player has a first-person perspective in Daniel and not a third-person
viewpoint (as the player does in Hah), the player has an identical community
of space with him. There is no physical separation from the character and
the player other the experience of Daniel having a virtual body.
Schutz’ second requirement is that in an empathetic relationship, “the
two partners are face to face [such that] their streams of consciousness are
synchronized and geared into each other... growing older together” (Schutz
162). The two partners must have independent, but similar, subjective ex-
periences. In Amnesia, Daniel knows no more than the player, and both
the player and the character experience simultaneous self-discovery of their
shared personalistic identity. Thus the player experiences their stream of
consciousness, and their character’s, as identical with Daniel’s, which far
surpasses Schutz’ requirement.11 This design feature blurs and dissolves the
11For instance, the player and Daniel learn their name at the same time. It is imaginable
that the character would experience the same lack of identification as the player when
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feeling of otherness with Daniel and the player lives-into him, reacting to the
horrors in the game-world. It is productive to understand this in terms of em-
pathy because it captures the identicality of emotional and social experience
of the player and character.
6. Living-with “Commander Shephard”
A player will not always live-into Daniel and may sometimes experience him
as an other. Breaks or interruptions may occur, and the Player/Character
relationship might shift to something which fails to constitute identity with
Daniel, i.e. the player might cease to empathize with Daniel in the sense of
living-into. The Mass Effect trilogy provides an example of a game where the
player experiences their character primarily as a personalistic other. In other
words, this is a case where a player “lives-with” their character whereby they
presence an other as an other.
In Mass Effect, the player plays a soldier referred to as Commander Shep-
ard. As in Halo, they have the task of saving the world, but unlike Master
Chief, Commander Shepard has a personality, a past, and an active and
player-determined role in shaping the world. Before the game begins, the
player picks one of several broad personal histories (e.g. being a hero who
single-handedly saved the day, or being a ruthless pragmatist who sacrificed
innocent civilians) as well as appearance and gender. These choices impact
the player’s experiences of the game-world as well as how computer-controlled
characters react to Command Shepard in certain situations.12
Although the player’s relationship with Commander Shepard meets the
requirements of Schutz’ face-to-face relationship, the player cannot contin-
uously live-into their character because of two features. First, the player
realizes that the character knows more about their in-game past than the
player, which creates the experience of Shepard being a distinct subjectivity.
For example, during the prologue of Mass Effect 2, Shepard enters into a con-
versation with another character regarding their past heroics in the recent
war. The player can choose how to characterize their past by selecting one
of several dialogue options that are displayed on the screen. For example,
hearing the name. Furthermore. the design feature of “having amnesia” offers meaning to
the player’s initial fumbling attempts to navigate the game-world (which occurs in, and is
potentially distracting, in all video games).
12This is called a “role-playing game” where the player’s objective is to make personal
and often emotionally-laden decisions.
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in response to the question “Gunnery Chief Ashley Williams was killed in
action. It was your call Why did you leave her behind,” the player can choose
“It was a hard choice,” “We are done here,” or “It was that or die.” Upon
selecting one of the options, the player hears an elaborate response and learns
that Shepard considered the solider who died to be a friend, even though the
player may have never interacted with this other character. In this way, the
player learns about Shepard. A Schutzian analysis of this would say that
the character’s past self is acting as a predecessor in the current situation,
preventing the player from fully living-into them.13 Shepherd seems to have
a hidden personal interiority which is, revealed piecemeal to the player, and
not simply shared as in the case of Daniel.
Another feature which contributes to “living-with” Shepard as opposed
to “living-into” them is that there will be times when the player disagrees
with their character. When a player disagrees with how Shepard talks about
a situation, it feels like Shepherd is speaking out of their own subjective ex-
perience, and not the player’s. Although there is a “general correspondence”
between the player and character’s response to the ingame events (because
they are in the same place at the same time), the character’s actions seem like
those of another person with their own subjective meanings (Schutz, 1932,
p.165). This prevents the player from feeling oneness with the character,
which causes them to relate to Shepard through Einfu¨hlung. However, this
is still a social interaction because Shepard appears, and is constituted, as a
personalistic other.
7. Conclusion
This is not to say that living-into a character is better than living-with one,
or that a player cannot vacillate between the two ways of relating to their
character. Indeed, it is possible to relate to a character in any of the three
ways discussed in the same game, which changes how a player experiences
their presence in a gameworld. The experience of vacillation and fluidity of
relation points to a reconception of presence. A player can be immersed in a
game and achieve a kind of presence in at least three different ways. First, a
Player/Character relationship can take the form of bodily extension through
an avatar, as exemplified by Halo. Second, as demonstrated by Amnesia, a
13A predecessor is “a person in the past no one of whose experiences overlaps in time
with one of mine” (Schutz, 1932, p.208).
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player can live-into a character and experience a degree of oneness. Third,
a player can experience their character as a personalistic other and live-with
them, as discussed in the context of Mass Effect. This type of understanding
of presence is made possible, and is supported by, the clear requirements of
a Schutzian framework and the attention to the experience of a player. A
phenomenological approach to understanding video games reveals them to
be complex sites of intra and interpersonal sociality and worthwhile objects
of study.
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